Denver Law Review
Volume 48

Issue 3

Article 6

January 1972

Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - School Desegregation Keyes v. School District Number One
Andrew L. Blair Jr.
Lawrence J. MacDonnell

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Andrew L. Blair, Jr. & Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - School
Desegregation - Keyes v. School District Number One, 48 Denv. L.J. 417 (1972).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION v. School District
School Desegregation -Keyes
Number One, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted,
40 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1972) (No. 507).
INTRODUCTION

T

HE 1969 electoral race for positions on the Denver School
Board centered almost entirely on the issue of whether
students should be bussed to achieve racial balance in the
city's public schools. Earlier in that year the Board had adopted
three resolutions1 containing busing plans which were to go
into effect the following fall. The candidates who ran in opposition to these resolutions were elected, and the newly constituted Board moved quickly to replace mandatory busing with
a voluntary transfer system.2 The plaintiffs in Keyes v. School
District Number One' thereupon filed a class action alleging
that the State of Colorado, acting through the Board, had violated their constitutional rights by treating them unequally in
regard to public school education. Through various requests
for preliminary and permanent relief, the plaintiffs sought an
order compelling the Board to cure the condition of segregation
alleged to exist in Denver schools.
Although the rescission of the busing resolutions seems to
have precipitated the Keyes litigation, the complaint was
pitched in terms ranging far beyond this single act. From the
standpoint of legal theory, the allegations fall basically under
two related headings. First, plaintiffs maintained that the
Board's decisions respecting school construction and attendance
boundaries had historically been made pursuant to a segregative
policy of which the rescission was but an obvious example.
Such action was alleged to violate the equal protection rule
established in Brown v. Board of Education.4 Second, the court
1Denver Board of Education Resolutions 1520, Jan. 30, 1969; 1524, Mar.
20, 1969; 1531, Apr. 24, 1969.
2
Denver Board of Education Resolution 1533, Jun. 9, 1969.
3 Due to the unusual number of opinions generated by this case, a traditional citation could only be confusing. The opinions of interest here
are 303 F. Supp. 279, 303 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1969), and 313 F.
Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970) from the trial court (the separate opinions
of the trial court are treated in the text as one) and 445 F.2d 990 (10th
Cir. 1971) from the appellate court. Cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3329
(U.S. Jan. 17, 1972) (No. 507).
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 48

was asked to find that Denver schools showing high concentrations of minority students offered an inferior educational
opportunity; that segregation, whatever its cause, was responsible for this inferiority; and that the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment would not permit segregation to
continue under the circumstances presented.
These arguments were accorded varying receptions in the
trial and appellate courts - a situation which always invites
comment. But this case is of more than usual interest. The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari and will at last speak
directly to the question of school segregation in states where
no officially segregated school system has ever existed. Given
the overwhelming social importance of this forthcoming decision, it is especially crucial that every relevant legal argument
be thoroughly aired and its soundness assessed. In furtherance
of this end, the discussion to follow treats the opinions of both
the trial and appellate courts as they relate to each of the
theories described above. Conclusions drawn from the discussion are combined to form a recommended judicial approach for
any litigation involving school segregation.
THE Brown PER SE RULE
of the fourteenth amendment
clause
protection
The equal
is, of course, the fountainhead of the legal issues involved in
school desegregation cases. The basic prohibition is that no
state may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. ' '5 Early cases involving the application
of this prohibition to public schools concerned officially separate school systems in which there could be no doubt that the
state was denying minority children the right to attend schools
on a nonsegregated basis. The question was whether this segregation was a denial of equal protection.
The initial judicial response was to apply the "separate-butequal" doctrine developed in regard to transportation facilities
0
Under that theory, segregation of the
in Plessy v. Ferguson.
races was not a denial of equal protection so long as the facili7
ties provided each were substantially equal. The Plessy Court
explicitly rejected the idea that separation implied inferiority.
In several cases following Plessy, minority plaintiffs were
able to force admission to all-white educational institutions by

I.

DE JURE SEGREGATION

5U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § 1.

6 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7 E.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Cumming v. Board of Educ.,
175 U.S. 528 (1899).
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proving that the facilities provided for their race were not in
fact equal to those available to whites.8 The Supreme Court
proved willing to consider not only tangible differences such as
faculties and libraries, but also important intangibles such as
the prestige of the institution in the community and the promi9
nence of its alumni.
The culmination of this trend toward increasing concern
for the welfare of minority students was the landmark case of
Brown v. Board of Education.' The question there presented
was whether "segregation of children in public schools solely
on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and
other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive[s] the children
of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?"' 1
The Court answered in the affirmative, concluding that
12
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.'
Other aspects of Brown are treated in more detail in Part
II of this comment. For present purposes it is sufficient to say
that Brown established the principle that any state-imposed
segregation is unconstitutional per se. And it was early recognized that this prohibition was not limited to segregative
statutes passed by state legislatures. Any state agency taking
intentionally segregative action has violated the fourteenth
amendment. 13 Therefore, if the Keyes plaintiffs could substantiate their claim of de jure segregation, they would need
14
show no more.
Although the de jure route leads most directly to a finding of unconstitutionality, it is by far the most difficult to
negotiate. The plaintiff is saddled with the often prohibitive
burden of proving intent through circumstantial evidence. He
must lay before the court school board actions so rotten with
segregative intent that even the judicial nose cannot mistake
the odor.
In order to understand the proof of intent offered by the
Keyes plaintiffs, it is necessary to review quickly the recent
history of racial housing patterns in Denver. 15 Prior to 1950
s Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332

U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
9 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
10 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
11 Id. at 493.
12

Id. at 495.

1 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
14 Id.
15 The summary to follow in the text is taken from a segment of the trial
court's opinion in 303 F. Supp. at 282.
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the black population was centered around an area of the core
city known as "Five Points." Through the intervening years
the black community has expanded eastward along a corridor
having relatively stable boundaries on the north and south.
By 1960 this expansion had reached Colorado Boulevard, a
large north-south thoroughfare which the trial court referred
to as "a natural dividing line," and by 1969 had moved on eastward well into the fashionable Park Hill area. As the trial
court noted, the trend of population movement had become
quite apparent long before it reached Colorado Boulevard.
The plaintiffs catalogued the significant Board decisions
with regard to attendance boundaries and school construction
which were made during this period and superimposed them
on the state of expansion current when each was made. 16 The
effect of theFe decisions had been to prevent the gradual influx
of minority students into formerly all-white schools. Attendance zone boundaries tended to follow housing patterns and to
keep minority students concentrated in certain schools. When
these schools became intolerably overcrowded, boundaries were
shifted so as to attach another school to the minority neighborhoods and exclude the still-white areas which that school
formerly served. Optional zones around schools in transition
allowed white students to "escape" to still-white schools.
As previously mentioned, the Board in 1969 adopted Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531 which were designed to achieve racial
balance primarily in the Park Hill schools.1 7 However, in
response to what was considered a voter mandate, these resolutions were rescinded in June of that year, just after two new
members were elected to the Board.
The trial court considered the evidence adduced in regard
to the Park Hill schools, including the rescission of Resolutions
1520, 1524, and 1531, separately from that relating to the schools
in the older core-city area. Judge Doyle found segregative
intent in the Board actions affecting the former, but refused
to find de jure segregation in the core city. It is submitted that
a careful analysis of the construction and attendance decisions
in the two areas will not reveal factual distinctions suffizient
16 The broad-brush review of the facts set out in the text is a condensation of the trial court's factual analysis in 303 F. Supp. at 290-94 and 313

F. Supp. at 69-73. The reader is urged to go to the opinions themselves
and form an independent judgment as to the validity of the conclusions

reached in the text.

17 These resolutions did affect some schools west of Colorado Boulevard.
True racial balance could not be achieved by dealing only with schools

in Park Hill proper.
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to account for this result." Granted, there was in the core
city no "legislative action similiar to the rescission of Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531,"''" but this factor cannot have been
crucial. Judge Doyle repeatedly indicated that the rescission
was not necessary to his finding of a constitutional deprivation:
"The policies and actions of the Board prior to the adoption of
Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531 . . . constitute de jure segregation. 212 Indeed, the circuit court found it unnecessary to even
consider the rescission once it had affirmed the finding quoted
above.

21

The true source of Judge Doyle's seemingly inconsistent
findings is not the facts, but his approach thereto. He undertook to justify this difference when he turned to the core-city
schools:
The evidentiary as well as the legal approach to the remaining schools is quite ditferent from that which has been outlined
above. For one thing, the concentration of minorities occurred at
an earlier date and, in some instances, prior to the Brown decision by the Supreme Court. Community attitudes were different, including the attitutes of the School Board members.
Furthermore, the transiticns were much more gradual and less
22
perceptible than they were in the Park Hill schools.

Unfortunately, Judge Doyle did not indicate just exactly
how the judicial approach should change in response to these
factors or, for that matter, why these factors necessitated any
change at all. Some insight may be gained by examining the
court's treatment of the two points which it felt the plaintiffs
and causation.
had failed to prove in the core city -intent
The standard for finding purposeful action in the Park Hill
area is reflected in the following language:
We do not find that the purpose here included malicious or
odious intent. At the same time, it was action which was taken
with knowledge of the consequences, and the consequences were
not merely possible, they were substantially certain. Under
2 "
such conditions the action is unquestionably wilful.
Yet when the court considered the core-city schools, something more was evidently required:
In examining the boundary changes and removal of optional
zones in connection with the several schools which are discussed
Is The opinions themselves must be studied to fully appreciate the extent
of the similarity between the two sets of facts. If anything, the evidence
relating to the core city schools seems stronger. 303 F. Supp. at 290-94;
313 F. Supp. at 69-73.
19 313 F. Supp. at 69.
211303 F. Supp. at 295 (emphasis added).

445 F.2d at 1002.
313 F. Supp. at 69.
23 303 F. Supp. at 286 (footnote omitted).

21

22
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above, we do not find any wilful or malicious actions on
part of the Board or the administration (in relationship to
mentary schools). As to these schools, the result is about
same as it would have been had the administration pursued
criminatory policies, since the Negroes and, to an extent
24
Hispanos as well, always seem to end up in isolation.
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The court attributed this result to the failure of the Board to
take integrating action and to the already established housing
patterns. However, it is evident just from the text of these two
quotations that the Park Hill standard would have dictated a
de jure finding in the core city. The evidence clearly showed
that the segregative effects of each proposed core-city decision
were brought forcefully to the attention of the Board. Apparently the court would be satisfied here with nothing less
than proof of malicious intent.
This notion that time somehow renders intent constitutionally harmless reappears throughout the opinion. For example, the following statements were made after a review of the
Board actions affecting core-city schools:
It should also be kept in mind that prior to Brown v. Board of
Education, supra, it was apparently taken for granted by everybody that the status quo, as far as the Negroes were concerned,
should not be disturbed because this was the desire of the
majority of the community. Time and again the Board members
testified to the fact that in making decisions they held hearings
and finally bowed to the community sentiment. Thus, they say
they did not intend to segregate or refuse to integrate. They just
found the consensus and followed it.25
The same argument was accorded much different treatment
when advanced in relation to the Park Hill schools:
The defendants have alluded to the fact that Resolution 1533
represents the will of the people, and that any action taken by
this Court which would adversely affect the Resolution would
frustrate that will. But as we have seen Brown v. Board of Ed.
and all of the subsequent cases hold that equal protection of the
laws is synonymous with the right to equal educational opportunities and that segregated schools can never provide that
equality. The constitutional protections afforded by the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment were designed to protect
fundamental rights, not only of the majority but of minorities
as well, even against the will of the majority. The effort to accommodate community sentiment or the wishes of a majority of
desirable, cannot justify
voters, although usually valid and
26
abandonment of our Constitution.

The distinction seems to center around the timing of the
313 F. Supp. at 73.
25 Id.
26 303 F. Supp. at 287-88.
24

1972
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acts in relation to the Brown decision.2 7 In effect, the court
excuses decisions made in the 1950's on the basis that school
authorities were not then aware of the extent of their responsibilities. They assumed that their decisions were constitutional
and given this legal purity of heart it would not now be fair
to attribute to them an unconstitutional intent. But what relevance can this possibly have? Were not the defendants in
Brown equally true to what everyone regarded as the mandate
of the fourteenth amendment? From a legal standpoint, the
factors mentioned cannot possibly justify the different standards used to gauge intent.
The second requirement which received inconsistent application with respect to the two school areas was causation. In
order to support a finding of de jure segregation, the plaintiffs
must prove that there is "a causal connection between the acts
of the school administration complained of and the current
condition of segregation. '28 Judge Doyle found no such causal
connection in the core city since the housing trend had passed
completely beyond these schools, and they would have become
segregated regardless of the actions of the Board. The court
felt that, even assuming intent, "it would be inequitable to
conclude de jure segregation exists where a de jure act had no
more than a trifling effect on the end result which produced
the condition.""2
On its face this argument has considerable
merit. It does seem a bit absurd to hold the Board responsible
when the present situation would be no better had it behaved
differently. But the assumption here is deceptive. Who can say
what would have happened if the Board had not made decisions
which abruptly changed the racial character of each school
in the line of eastward expansion from predominantly white
to predominantly minority? As the plaintiffs pointed out in
their appellate brief,30 these sudden shifts in racial composition
may well have been a powerful force in driving white families
out of the neighborhood3 1 At the least, the Board actions must
have been a contributing cause. A finding of no causation,
which allows continued segregation, cries out for more convincing support than it was given here.
It is interesting to note that all save one of the acts complained of
were post-Brown. 313 F. Supp. at 69-73.
28 313 F. Supp. at 73.
29 Id. at 74.
30 Opening brief for cross-appellants at 46, Keyes v. School Dist., 445 F.2d
990 (10th Cir. 1971).
3 1 See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecktenburg Case -Its
Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697 (1971).
27
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The most interesting point arising out of the causation question concerns the lack of consistency with which it was treated
in the core city and Park Hill areas. As with the core-city
schools, several of the Park Hill schools are considerably behind
the forefront of current black expansion. Yet Judge Doyle's
findings do not exempt them from the de jure category on the
basis of lack of causation. As though aware of this incongruity,
a footnote to the causation discussion 2 indicates that even noncausal segregative acts may be probative of the intentionally
segregative nature of later decisions and gives as an example
several Park Hill schools which were discussed in connection
with the rescission of Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531. However,
the footnote fails to mention that in a prior opinion it was
specifically held that the construction and attendance boundary
decisions affecting these schools constituted de jure segregation.33 It was this finding, rather than that relating to the
rescission, which was later affirmed by the circuit court.
In sum, there are two glaring discrepancies in the court's
treatment of the core city and Park Hill areas. By applying
different standards of intent and causation, different conclusions were reached on essentially identical facts. The only
apparent justification was that attitudes had radically changed
since the core-city decisions N._,e made. Upon looking at the
more recent Board decisions in Park Hill, one wonders
just how
34
great the change has been.
35
The district court decision was appealed by both sides.

313 F. Supp. at 74-75 n.18.
303 F. Supp. at 295.
34 It might be appropriate at this point to question the trial court's separation of the core city and Park Hill schools. If, as the court freely admitted, the process of black expansion was a single continuing trend,
what possible reason could there be for dividing it at Colorado Boulevard and viewing the resulting areas separately? The reason is very
possibly to be found in the court's heavy reliance on the recission of
the resolutions designed to integrate the Park Hill Schools. Having
treated only the areas covered by those resolutions in the original
opinion, the core city formed a "residue" which could be treated
separately if for no other reason than that the Park Hill area had
already been disposed of.
But why does this separation justify different treatment? As a
matter of pure speculation, it may have been that Judge Doyle, as a
resident of Denver, was aware of the more dramatic nature of the
black expansion into Park Hill- dramatic not so much because of its
speed, but because of the socio-economic status of the Park Hill residents. As Judge Doyle pointed out, Colorado Boulevard serves as a
natural dividing line. Park Hill had always been insulated from the
core city by this wide six-lane thoroughfare. When the barrier was
breached, the white panic so common to transitional neighborhoods
set in with a vengeance. Racist thoughts were blooming where none
had grown before. Perhaps these recent events strengthened the impression of intent when the evidence relating to Park Hill was reviewed.
35 Keyes v. School Dist., 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971).
32

33
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The Tenth Circuit, through Judge Hill, approved the trial
court's treatment of the de jure question. Applying the clear
error rule, 30; Judge Hill saw sufficient evidence in the record
to support a de jure finding in Park Hill and a finding of no
intent in the core city. He did not mention the inconsistency
in the intent and causation standards applied below. It is obvious that if Judge Doyle was in error in applying these different
standards, Judge Hill's use of the clear error rule was inappropriate. For until the proper legal standard has been determined, it is impossible to determine whether a particular
factual finding is supportable. For example, what would be
clear error under a malicious intent standard might be perfectly acceptable if a man is deemed to intend the foreseeable
consequences of his acts.
The appellate court's failure to deal with this legal issue
leaves unanswered the most pressing question in de jure
cases-what is necessary to prove intent? In purely practical
terms, any standard more rigorous than that applied by Judge
Doyle in the Park Hill area would limit the modern applications of Brown to unimaginably blatant cases of purposefully
segregative state action. Given the importance of what potential plaintiffs have at stake, it is hardly in keeping with the
protective spirit of Brown to require concrete proof of maliciousness.
Another solution to the problem of proving intent was
offered by plaintiffs on appeal. They argued that once they
had objectively demonstrated the segregative effect of the
defendants' actions, a presumption should have arisen and the
Board should have had the burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the resultant segregation was not intended. In support
of this proposition, plaintiffs cited two cases-United States
v. School District 1513- and Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority.

38

In School District 151 Judge Hoffman made the following
conclusion of law:
The contemporaneous existence, within one system, of some
schools whose faculties and student bodies are almost exclusively
white and other schools whose faculties and student bodies are
almost exclusively Negro creates a presumption of discriminatory faculty assignments which requires the school authorities
39
to demonstrate the constitutionality of their procedures.
36 FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
37286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968), permanent injunction granted, 301 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
38 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.1969).
39 286 F. Supp. at 797.
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In Gautreaux, a case involving alleged discrimination in site
selection for public housing, the court said:
The statistics on the family housing sites considered during the
five major programs show a very high probability, a near certainty, that many sites were vetoed on the basis of the racial
composition of the site's neighborhood. In the face of these figures, CHA's failure to present a substantial or even speculative
indication that racial criteria were not used entitles plaintiffs
40
to a judgment as a matter of law.

Realizing that, even with this case support, a showing of
segregative effect might not be considered sufficient to raise a
presumption, the plaintiffs added another factor: the "traditional doctrine often repeated by the courts . . . that where
facts pleaded by one party lie peculiarly in the knowledge of
the adversary, the latter has the burden of proving it."' 4I This
doctrine seems particularly appropriate in the present case. It
is virtually impossible for the plaintiffs to produce direct evidence of intent. On the other hand, evidence of a lack of
segregative purpose should be within ready reach of the Board
whch presumably keeps records of its actions and the data upon
which they were based. If these records fail to disclose a
realistic and rational justification for its decisions, it does not
seem unreasonable to assume that the Board intended what it
accomplished.
Judge Hill did not agree.
Where, as here, the system is not a dual one, and where no
type of state imposed segregation has previously been established, the burden is on plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the racial imbalance exists and that it was
caused by intentional state action. Once a prima facie case is
made, the defendants have the burden of going forward with
the evidence. They may attack the allegations of segregatory
intent, causation and/or defend on the4 2grounds of justification
in terms of legitimate state interests.

Besides being insensitive to the problems of circumstantial
proof, this standard is palpably erroneous. State imposed segregation is unconstitutional per se, and no question of justification arises once it has been shown. Witness Judge Hill's earlier
statement of the applicable law:
We begin with the fundamental principle that state imposed
unequal and
racial segregation in public schools is inherently
43
violative of the equal protection clause.

Although this inconsistency in legal theory was not crucial
40

296 F. Supp. at 913.

41 C.

MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

445 F.2d at 1006 (citations omitted).
43 Id. at 999.
42

§ 318 (1954).
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to the outcome of this portion of the case, it serves to reemphasize the prevailing confusion as to the proper standard
for proving de jure segregation. Until clear guidelines are
supplied, plaintiffs will continue to receive irreconcilable judgments which have little apparent relation to the facts presented.
II. NEW EQUAL

PROTECTION

The second major branch of the plaintiffs' case involves a
far more sophisticated equal protection argument designed to
achieve the same end as a finding of de jure segregation but
without the necessity of proving intent. In order to put this
theory in perspective, it is necessary to undertake a brief
review of the development of the doctrine of equal protection.
A.

Equal Protection in General

Any law necessarily establishes classifications in the form
of conditions precedent to its application-the elements of a
crime, the requirements to obtain a license, etc. The concern
of equal protection is that these classifications be rationally
related to the end which the law is designed to serve. 44 However, the standard originally applied to judge rationalitypopularly styled "old equal protection"- was minimal indeed.
If the classification might be rational under any conceivable
state of facts, the courts would uphold the law. 4 The plaintiff in such a case had an almost conclusive presumption of
validity to overcome.
It was, of course, incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish
some inequality of treatment that resulted from the state
action of which he complained. In the normal case this requirement created no problem. The court was faced with a
statute which accorded benefits or imposed punishments depending upon the presence or absence of certain traits. Persons
who possessed these traits were quite obviously treated differently, in terms of the purpose of the statute, from those
who did not. The court could easily judge whether the statutory criteria upon which the distinction was made formed a
rational basis for the inequality of treatment received.
However, in the separate-but-equal cases, the inequality
was not nearly so apparent. No matter what the student's race,
he went to school. A Plessy-minded court could see no inequality there. The major departure in Brown was that sep44 E.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
45 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
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arate schools were seen as inherently unequal. This finding for
the first time gave legal recognition to the inequality of educational opportunity suffered by the victims of segregation.
It is absolutely crucial to fully understand the causal relationship between the statutory classification in Brown (race)
and the constitutional inequality found by the Court (an unequal educational opportunity). The inequality complained of
was not the direct statutory consequence of the possession of
the trait upon which the application of the statute depended.
The immediate effect of the statute was segregation. But the
ultimate "real-world" effect, in terms of the purpose of the law,
was inequality of educational opportunity. Since the immediate
effect had a causal connection to the ultimate effect, the inequality complained of was sufficiently the result of the statutory classification to entitle the plaintiffs to a judicial determination as to the rationality of the relation between classification and purpose.
Unfortunately, the Court did not undertake an assessment
of rationality after it found inequality. It can only be assumed
that in 1954 no one even bothered to make the gesture of arguing that race was a proper criterion upon which to decide educational matters. Be that as it may, the failure of the Court
to complete its equal protection analysis has been the cause of
much confusion. Courts have had to speculate as to what other
considered but unmentioned factors in Brown were crucial to
the decision. However, the nature of equal protection at that
time is sufficiently clear to allow a reconstruction of the
omitted steps. 4 ' The classification established by the statute
was race. The purpose of the law was to provide public education. The ultimate effect of the classification was inequality
in the educational opportunity offered. This inequality was
constitutionally permissible only if the criterion upon which
it was based bore some rational relation to the provision of
public education. Since there could be no rational connection
between a student's race and the education he should receive,
the law providing separate schools was unconstitutional.
Brown, then, may be seen as embodying two principles.
Generally, a classification which has the ultimate effect of
producing inequality must be based on criteria which are
rationally related, in terms of the purpose of the act, to the
46 As will subsequently be seen, the relegation of Brown to the

realm of

the old equal protection with its minimal review standard may do it an
injustice. The Court dwelt at length on the importance of education in
terms quite familiar to the new equal protection ear.
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difference in treatment which flows from their application.
More specifically, where the facts are as they were in Brown,
i.e., where race is the classification, there is always a constitutional violation since segregation always results in inequality
and race is never rationally related to the purpose of a
public education statute or the unequal treatment in which
it results. This latter is the per se rule of Brown upon which
the plaintiffs in Keyes relied in the portion of the case first
discussed herein. But this rule is not the limit of Brown, nor
of the fourteenth amendment. As indicated by the more generally applicable first principle, the court is not relieved of its
obligation to examine the classification that was used simply
because it finds that a racial classification was not used, i.e.,
that there was no intentional segregation.
At the risk of being repetitive, this last idea will be restated, for in it lies the key to understanding Brown. The inquiry into intent is simply a judicial effort to fix the classification which was in fact used. A finding of intent to segregate
means that the state differentiated on the basis of race, an
inherently impermissible classification, either overtly or in the
guise of some otherwise neutral classification such as the
neighborhood school system. Lack of intent means only that a
racial classification was not used-it does not mean that the
classification that was in fact used, e.g., the neighborhood
school system, is necessarily valid. That cannot be known until
47
the full equal protection analysis has been completed.
The preceding discussion has assumed that a "rational
relation" between classification and purpose is all that the
equal protection clause requires. In a line of cases beginning
even before Brown, the Supreme Court has indicated that in
certain situations a far more rigorous test will be applied. This
"new equal protection" doctrine is called into play where the
classification is based on "suspect" criteria or adversely affects
a "fundamental" right. Such a classification will receive "strict
scrutiny" from the bench and must be justified in terms of a
"compelling state interest. ' 48
The birth of new equal protection can be traced back to
1942 and the case of Skinner v. Oklahoma.4 9 The Court was
there asked to declare unconstitutional a statute requiring the
47 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
48 Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969).
49 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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compulsory sterilization of habitual criminals. The statutory
classification "habitual criminal" was defined to include any
person with a record of two or more convictions for felonies
involving moral turpitude who was thereafter convicted of
another such felony and sentenced to an Oklahoma prison. An
exception to this classification provided that certain offenses,
including embezzlement, would not be considered in applying
the statute.
The Court first acknowledged that the actions of state
governments carry an impressive presumption of validity. Even
so, it felt that the statute could not stand:
[T]he instant legislation runs afoul of the equal protection
clause, though we give Oklahoma that large deference which
the rule . . . requires. We are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights cf man. Marriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and sur50
vival of the race.

After discussing the potential for abuse inherent in the power
to sterilize and the irretrievable loss of liberty which followed
its exercise, the Court continued:
We mention these matters not to reexamine the scope of the
police power of the States. We advert to them merely in
emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny of the classification
which a state makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest
unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made
against groups or types of individuals in violation of the con51
stitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.

In strictly scrutinizing the Oklahoma statute, the Court
discovered, by reference to other state criminal laws, that, e.g.,
the difference between larceny by fraud (a felony involving
moral turpitude) and embezzlement (a felony excepted by the
statute) might turn on the timing of the formation of the
felon's intent to appropriate the property of another to his own
use. The Court could find no basis upon which to infer that
such timing had any genetic significance. Therefore, the classification was insupportable.
Skinner appears to have been a significant departure from
the traditional equal protection approach. Rather than imagining situations in which the classification might be rational, the
Court made a detailed search for irrationalities. It looked not
only at the statute in question, but also to the other laws which
might affect its operation. This special approach where funda50 Id. at 541.

(emphasis added). The italicized word "unwittingly" is certainly
inconsistent with the notion that a violation of the fourteenth amendment requires intent.
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mental rights are involved was to become the cornerstone of
the new equal protection.
Although Brown contains no reference to Skinner, a cursory
glance at the two opinions makes it clear that the Court's view
of the nature of the right involved in each was essentially
similar. For example:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments ....
It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship....
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
52
equal terms.

It would not seem a distortion of this language to say that the
Court considered education a fundamental right. The holding in
Brown cannot be divorced from the embryonic new equal protection notion in Skinner, and it is therefore doubly unfortunate
that

the full equal

protection

analysis

was

not

supplied.

A

clear indication of the effect which the Court's special regard
for education had upon its approach

to the case

might have

avoided much confusion.
Since these early beginnings the growth of new equal protection has been startling. The process has consisted of the incorporation of an increasing number of individual interests into
the category of "fundamental rights""

and the development of

the idea that certain classifications are inherently suspect and
should

be

the object

right involved.5

4

The

of strict
following

scrutiny

no matter

language

from

what

the

McDonald v.

5-347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
5 See Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of
the "Natural-Law-Due-ProcessFormula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716, 743-44
(1969), where the following "basic rights" are listed as having received
new equal protection treatment since Skinner:
(1)
voting [Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)];
(2)
marriage [Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)];
(3)
fairness in the criminal process [Gardner v. California, 393
U.S. 367 (1969); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)];
(4)
education [Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967),
modified sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), with
additional support from Brown];
(5)
interstate travel [Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)];
and
(6)
the intimate familial relationship between parent and child
[Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)].
.4 See Karst, supra note 53, at 740-43. Mr. Karst considers wealth, Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and race, Brown, to be firmly established
as suspect classifications and indicates that sex and student status may
receive similar treatment in future cases.
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Board of Election Commissioners55 summarizes these developments in regard to voting rights:
[W]e have held that because of the overriding importance of voting rights, classifications "which might invade or restrain them
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined" where those
rights are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause ....
And a careful examination on our part is especially warranted
where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race . . . two
factors which would independently render a classification highly
5
suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny. "

The Court has not insisted that the suspect classification
be explicitly set out in the statute. It is enough that the harsh
effect of the law falls on some class for which the law has a
57
special solicitude. For example, in Griffin v. Illinois the Court

considered a statute which allowed appellate review in criminal
cases as a matter of right, but required that the defendant
furnish certain documents to the appeals court which sometimes
could not be prepared without a stenographic transcript of the
trial. Because of the cost of obtaining such a transcript, the
effect of this statute was to discriminate against the poor when
they attempted to exercise the right to appeal criminal convictions. The Court treated the statute exactly as though it had
58
established a classification based on wealth, and required the
state to devise some means of providing appellate review to
those who could not afford a transcript. Thus, even a techmay be traced in its
nically nondiscriminatory classification
59
falls.
burden
the
where
see
to
effect
The growth of the new equal protection has not been confined to the factors which give cause for its application. It
has recently become apparent that the Court is no longer satisfied with the Skinner approach of strictly scrutinizing a classification to see if any irrationality exists in its relation to the
purpose of the statute. The focus has shifted to the effects of
the classification. That is, the Court will require that the state
demonstrate some "compelling state interest" which is furthered
55394 U.S. 802 (1969).
Id. at 807 (citations omitted). The language is essentially dicta since the
Court found that the facts presented did not fulfill either of the requirements for the application of the new equal protection standard.
57 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
5is The Court here was considering the wealth classification to judge its
rationality in relation to purpose rather than as a factor calling for the
new equal protection approach. However, Griffin is generally considered to have established a principle which is fully applicable in the
latter context. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 507 (D.D.C. 1967),
modified sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
5 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 506-07 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub
no'm. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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by the classification in order to justify the infringement on
0
the rights of the plaintiff.
This approach is well illustrated in Shapiro v. Thompson. 1
The fact situation involved statutes imposing a 1-year residency
requirement on eligibility for welfare assistance. The Court
held that there is a constitutional right to travel interstate
and that this residency requirement chilled the exercise of that
right. Defendants offered as justification four governmental
objectives which were allegedly served by the 1-year requirement. All four were administrative or economic concerns.
Before assessing their merit, the Court had this to say:
At the outset, we reject appellants' argument that a mere
showing of a rational relationship between the waiting period
and these four admittedly permissible state objectives will suf[A]ppellees were exercisfice to justify the classification ....
ing a constitutional right, and any classification which serves to
penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconsti62
tutional.

In examining the justifications offered, the Court made it
clear that the term "compelling" was used advisedly. Each
of the four was rejected either because the classification did not
in fact promote the proffered objective or because there was a
less onerous alternative for accomplishing the same end.
The net effect of new equal protection is to strip state
action of its presumptive validity. If the plaintiff can show
some harm in the form of unequal treatment under a suspect
classification or in respect to a fundamental right, the state
must show that the public benefit flowing from the classification established is great enough to justify the harm suffered by
the plaintiff. It becomes a balancing exercise - individual harm
(most often a whole class of individuals) v. public benefit.
B. Equal Protection in Keyes
With this background in general equal protection theory,
we may proceed to examine the second portion of the Keyes
opinions. The plaintiffs first sought to establish a legal injury
for which relief could be granted. They introduced evidence
that the Denver schools with high concentrations of minority
students offered an educational opportunity which was inferior
to that available at the predominantly Anglo schools. Each
6oKramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub nom. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
61 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
62

Id. at 634.
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school was rated on five indicia of quality: (1) average scholastic achievement of pupils; (2) teacher experience; (3) teacher
turnover; (4) dropout rates; and (5) age and size of school
facilities.6 3 The trial court found that schools with 70 to 75
percent black or Hispano students consistently rated below
Anglo schools in each of these categories and that this was
sufficient proof that an inferior educational opportunity was
being offered in the minority schools.
Plaintiffs then introduced expert testimony which persuaded the trial court that the correlation between inferiority
64
Judge Doyle
and minority concentrations was not fortuitous.
is a major
cause,
its
of
regardless
"segregation,
that
concluded
educational
factor in producing inferior schools and unequal
opportunity. '" ;5 "Many factors contribute . . . but the predominant one appears to be enforced isolation imposed in the name
66
of neighborhood schools and housing patterns."
Having found the requisite factual inequality, the court
proceeded to a discussion of the traditional equal protection
standard still applicable to economic regulation, and then introduced the new equal plotection theory:
The courts ... have jealously guarded the rights of disadvantaged groups such as the poor or minorities, and have held
that where state action, even if non-discriminatory on its face,
results in the unequal treatment of the poor or a minority group
as a class, the action is unconstitutional unless the state provides a substantial justification in terms of legitimate state interest .

. .

. This general principal of constitutional law is fully

67
applicable to school segregation cases.

Already the court has accomplished two important tasks.
First, and foremost, it recognized that the general principles
of equal protection must be applied even after a lack of intentional segregation has been found, i.e., that the Brown per se
rule is not the limit of the fourteenth amendment in school
segregation cases. Second, it applied the Griffin principle that
the classification need not be overtly racial in order to elicit
68
However, the opinion
the new equal protection response.
of new equal probranch
other
the
of
advantage
take
to
fails
The court's discussion of these five factors and the significance of each
is found in 313 F. Supp. at 79-81.
64 313 F. Supp. at 81-82.
65 Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 83 (footnote omitted). This thinly veiled implication that Denver's
neighborhood school policy was a sham is difficult to reconcile with
the earlier finding that no intent to segregate was evident in the core
63

67

city.
Id. at 82.

68

See Griffin discussion, note 58 supra.
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tection which was clearly available. There is no discussion of
education as a fundamental right.
And this is but the first unfortunate aspect of the opinion.
After the groundwork had been so nicely laid, the new equal
protection analysis was not completed. Instead, the court
moved rather more directly to the conclusion that a constitutional violation existed by way of a modern version of the old
Plessy argument. To wit, although the school board need not
take affirmative action to eliminate de facto segregation, it is
under a constitutional duty to insure that its schools offer an
equal educational oportunity. Since the court had previously
held that the minority schools in Denver were inferior, it
naturally concluded that the Board had failed to discharge this
duty. And since segregation, even though de facto, was
the cause of this failure, the appropriate remedy was desegregation.6 9
Judge Doyle seems to have lifted this theory directly from
the opinion of Judge Wright in Hobson v. Hansen.70 Indeed,
that is the only case cited. However, the qualification which
accompanied the theory in Hobson was not discussed in Keyes.
Judge Wright noted that a strict application of the Plessy
argument would always dictate unconstitutionality when inequality was discovered. 7' But in this modern context where
no de jure segregation is present, Judge Wright felt that "no
court would advance so absolutist an approach. 7' 2 The state
must be allowed an opportunity to justify its actions. A
thorough discussion of the justification issue in the trial court's
opinion would have made the analysis much stronger.
Despite Judge Wright's indication in Hobson that the Plessy
argument as there applied was something of a first, when put
in proper perspective the illusion of uniqueness is dispelled.
It is merely a restatement of the new equal protection. The
state can run its school system according to any nonracial
classification it chooses, even if the effect is segregation. However, if an inequality of educational opportunity results, the
state must justify its choice of classifications by showing that
they yield some positive social benefit sufficient to offset the
harm from the inequality. Since segregation always results in
inequality, the state will always need to justify its classifica69 313 F. Supp. at 82-83.
70269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson,

408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
71
72

Cases cited note 8 supra.
269 F. Supp. at 497.
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tions where they produce segregation. Thus, there is no difference in substance or result between new separate-but-equal
and new equal protection. However, it is always a sad event
when a new label is thrown into an area as confused as this.
One has to regret Judge Wright's inclusion of this theory, especially since he presented a detailed and complete analysis in
the more usual terms of new equal protection later in his
opinion. 73 Even more to be regretted is Judge Doyle's decision
to adopt the former rather than the latter.
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals could not agree with the
separate-but-equal approach.74 Although the details of the analysis are sometimes hard to follow, 75 it is evident that the
reason for reversal was lack of intent:
However, then, in the final analysis, the finding that an unequal
educational opportunity exists in the designated core schools must
rest squarely on the premise that Denver's neighborhood school
policy is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment because it permits segregation in fact. This76 . .. cannot be accepted under the
existing law of this Circuit.

The only reasonable interpretation of this statement is that
no constitutional violation is possible if the segregation was not
intentional, i.e., resulted from good faith adherence to a neighborhood school policy. The court appears to have been caught
in the confusion surrounding the Brown per se rule which is
here seen as the limit of the fourteenth amendment in school
cases. The neighborhood school policy is transmuted into a principle of constitutional law which, if religiously adhered to,
offers complete protection no matter what its factual results.
If our prior discussion of equal protection theory has any
semblance of validity, this cannot be the law. There is not
now, nor has there ever been, an intent requirement in the
fourteenth amendment. Yet this court and others like it ' 7 con73 Id. at 506-08.

445 F.2d at 1002-05.
This portion of Judge Hill's opinion is genuinely difficult to interpret.
For example, at one point he indicates that he can see no reason why
an unequal educational opportunity would not be a constitutional violation "provided the state has acted to cause the harm without substantial
justification in terms of legitimate state interest." 445 F.2d at 1004. If
the reference is to intentional state action, it is difficult to reconcile the
opportunity given for justification with the holding in Broum that
de jure segregation is per se a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
If no intent is contemplated, then the ultimate decision that there was
no constitutional violation is in direct conflict with this statement since
no discussion of justification was undertaken which would account for
that result.
76 445 F.2d at 1004.
77 E.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 914; Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
,4

75
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tinue to treat school cases as though they were sui generis to
be decided under a separate constitutional amendment enacted
in Brown. The effect, of course, is that the whole body of equal
protection law which the Supreme Court has been at such
pains to develop in order to protect individual liberties is lost
to minority children seeking to equip themselves to survive in
modern society.
III. A

RECOMMENDED APPROACH

Neither of the Keyes opinions appears to be an exemplar
of legal theory. On the de jure question the trial court used
inconsistent standards to judge intent and causation in the two
areas of Denver considered. The appellate court failed to note
this inconsistency. In considering new equal protection, Judge
Doyle certainly arrived at the appropriate result, but he failed
to perform the necessary step-by-step analysis. The appellate
court mistook the Brown per se rule for the fourteenth amendment. In view of the confusion engendered by these and similar
opinions, it seems appropriate to attempt to combine the lessons
learned in the foregoing discussion into a recommended approach to equal protection problems in any state where no dual
school system has ever existed.
The inquiry must first focus on the possible existence of
de jure segregation. If the plaintiffs can bring themselves under
the Brown per se rule, no further analysis will be necessary.
They face the formidable task of amassing sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove intent. Ideally, a showing that segregation exists, coupled perhaps with evidence of school attendance boundary and construction decisions which had a segregative effect, would give rise to a rebuttable presumption of
intent. If the defendants could demonstrate some reasonably
weighty justification for these decisions the presumption would
disappear.
Barring a presumption, the standard used to judge intent
should be that a person is deemed to intend the foreseeable
consequences of his acts. Only under this test can the subjective element of intent be rendered capable of objective proof.
As to causation, the plaintiff cannot reasonably be required
to show that the present state of segregation is the direct and
proximate result of any past state action. This concept of causation presents almost insurmountable problems in relatively
simple tort suits. It becomes totally unmanageable when
applied to anything so complex as the myriad social forces
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which go into the determination of racial housing patterns. The
burden should be only to show that intentional state action in
78
the past had a segregative effect which was never corrected.
If plaintiffs fail to establish that a racial classification has
been used, i.e., intent, then the analysis must proceed along the
normal equal protection lines. Since the Brown per se rule is
not available, plaintiffs must demonstrate some legally recognizable injury which flows from the classification established
-here, the neighborhood school policy. Under the cases discussed,7 9 the court must look to the "real-world" effect of the
classification and not just to its statutory consequences. Therefore, the plaintiffs may establish inequality by statistical evidence and then prove that the inequality results from segregation produced when the neighborhood school policy is applied
to current racial housing patterns. There is no need to show
that this result was intended.8 0
Even under the old equal protection standard, proof of inequality would entitle the plaintiffs to a judicial determination
as to whether there is a rational relation between the neighborhood school policy and the purpose of providing an education (or whatever other legitimate state purposes might be
served). Presumably this minimal test would be met. Certainly there is an imaginable set of circumstances in which the
relation might be very rational indeed.
However, the plaintiffs are not limited to the old equal
protection approach. Education falls squarely within the class
of fundamental rights.s1 This in itself should call for strict
judicial scrutiny of the effects of the neighborhood school
system. But it need not stand alone. For although no suspect
class is overtly used, the detrimental effects attributed to this
classification fall on a minority group "for which the Constitution has a special solicitude. 8 2- This focused effect adds great
weight to the new equal protection argument.
78

7)

"The school board will also have to show that its past discriminatory
racial designation of schools, site selection, and
conduct -involving
determination of school size - is not a link in the causal chain producing the segregation." Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case -Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 697, 701
(1971). The author was speaking in the context of a state which formerly had separate school systems.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.

483 (1954).

80 Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
81 Karst, supra note 53, at 743, citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), modified
sub noa. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
82 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 507 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub
nom. Smuck V. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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Assuming that the strict scrutiny test is to be applied, the
burden falls on the state to produce some compelling state
interest promoted by the classification in order to justify the
inequality of treatment demonstrated by the plaintiffs. "[Tihe
objectives . . .further [ed] must be unattainable by narrower
or less offensive . . .courses; and even so, those objectives must
be of sufficient magnitude to override, in the court's judgment,
the evil of the inequality which the [classification] en83
genders.
The balancing process by which the justification question
must be resolved is delicate indeed. The state has important
economic and administrative interests in the neighborhood
school system. Any solution to segregation which is so expensive as to destroy the state's ability to perform its educational
function is clearly unwarranted. However, it would be a highly
unusual case in which the burden approached this level. Barring concrete proof of prohibitive expense, the economic and
administrative concerns of the state are simply not sufficient to
overbalance the deprivation inherent in segregated schools. 4
But these are not the interests which weigh most heavily
in favor of the neighborhood school system. The primary
interest of the state is to provide a sound education to all students. Therefore, the balance is to be struck between the
benefits and the burdens of mandatory integration from the students' point of view. The disadvantages of the neighborhood
school system to the students, both white and black, far outweigh the advantages. Granted, there is a greater safety hazard
whenever the distance between home and school is increased.
There may be other drawbacks of like nature. But how do
these compare to the experience of becoming a part of a heterogeneous student body where different backgrounds and outlooks interact daily in the learning process? If today's children
are to avoid the racial misfortunes which have characterized
modern America, they must be given an opportunity to escape
the taught hatred of those years. The neighborhood school
policy tends only to perpetuate the past.
It seems fitting to close with a consideration of the following statement from Judge Wright's Hobson opinion in which he
answered the defendants' attempt to lend historical dignity to

83

Id.
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How many dollars must the state save to justify its failure to educate a
single child?
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the neighborhool school system by tracing its existence back to
the principles of Horace Mann:
[D]efendants' appropriation of Horace Mann as the supposed
architect of today's neighborhood school policy .

.

. is singularly

unjust. For Mann believed that public schools were at the
source of the democratic enterprise; his faith, like that of his
fellow reformers, was that the public school, by drawing into the
close association of the classroom students from every social,
economic and cultural background, would serve as an object
lesson in equality and brotherhood and undermine the social class
divisions which he and his colleagues felt were inimical to
85
democracy.

These are the highest goals of education. They were at one
time served by the neighborhood school system and still are
in many cities. But there can be no justification for continued
adherence to the neighborhood school system where, because
of changing social conditions, it operates to frustrate the principle in response to which it was designed. Any decision to
abandon the neighborhood school policy as a basic plan must
be legislatively made. However, the failure of legislatures to
act cannot relieve the courts of the obligation to require compelling justification for state infringement upon individual
rights. A dysfunctional school policy can never justify its own
ill effects."6
Andrew L. Blair, Jr.
Lawrence J. MacDonnell

85 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 505 (D.D.C. 1967), modified sub

nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (footnote
omitted).
86 This is not to suggest that justification is never possible. The point is
that the courts should not assume an attitude of unthinking reverence
for the neighborhood school policy before its virtues have been demonstrated.

